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We explore the effect of volatility in the federal funds market on the expectations 
hypothesis in money markets.  We find that lower volatility in the bank funding markets 
market, all else equal, leads to a lower term premium and thus longer-term rates for a given 
setting of the overnight rate.  The results appear to hold for the US as well as the Euro Area 
and the UK.  The results have implications for the design of operational frameworks for the 
implementation of monetary policy and for the interpretation of the changes in the Libor-OIS 
spread during the financial crisis.   
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Central banks typically control an overnight interest rate as their policy tool, and most 
economists think that the transmission of monetary policy happens through the relationship of 
this overnight rate to the rest of the yield curve.  The expectations hypothesis, that longer-
term rates should equal expected future short-term rates plus a term premium, provides the 
typical framework for understanding this relationship.  The degree of control that the Federal 
Reserve has exercised over the funds rate has not been constant through time, and the recent 
financial crisis led to dislocations in many money markets.  We explore the effect that 
volatility in the federal funds market has on the expectations hypothesis in money markets.  
Specifically, we look for evidence that volatility in the overnight rate can affect the term 
premium embedded in longer-term money market rates. 
The Federal Reserve has had a target for the federal funds rate for decades.  Although 
from 1979 to 1982, the path of nonborrowed reserves was the official operating framework, 
both before and after, the Federal Open Market Committee had an intended level for the 
funds rate (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1992, Rudebusch, 1995, Meulendyke, 1998).  The 
volatility in the funds market, however, has not been constant (see Bennett and Peristiani, 
2002, Hilton, 2005, Demiralp and Farley, 2005, Nautz and Schmidt, 2009).  Demiralp and 
Farley have documented the decline in volatility in the funds market during the 1990s, for 
example, and attribute the trend to higher frequency of open market operations on the part of 
the Federal Reserve, improved reserve management of banks, and consolidations in the 
banking system.  Nautz and Schmidt (2009) note that the steps taken towards transparency 
since 1994 further stabilized the funds rate volatility.  As monetary policy in the United 
States has become more transparent and predictable, the anticipation of changes to the target 
rate led to movements in the funds rate before many target rate changes.  Carpenter and  
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Demiralp (2006) investigate this phenomenon and document that there is some evidence that 
the anticipation effect is transmitted to the very near end of the yield curve.  In this paper, we 
try to estimate what effect more generalized volatility in the federal funds rate has on longer-
term money market rates. 
The expectations hypothesis has been studied extensively in the economics literature.  
Among the more notable examples are Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz, 1983, Campbell 
and Schiller, 1991, Mankiw and Miron, 1986, and Rudebusch, 1995.  The literature provides 
mixed support for the expectations hypothesis in its most simple form, however, with the 
allowance for (potentially time-varying) term premiums, the record improves.  For the short 
end of the yield curve, Lange, Sack, and Whitesell (2003), as an example, provide evidence 
that the link between expected future short rates and longer-term rates has become stronger 
with more transparent and predictable monetary policy. 
Many researchers who have tested the expectations hypothesis, however, have found 
very weak evidence at the short end of the yield curve.  Mankiw and Miron (1986) attributed 
the negligible predictive power of the spread between long rates and short rates to the Federal 
Reserve’s interest smoothing policies.  They argued that the Federal Reserve’s interest 
stabilization policies induced a random walk behavior at the short end of the yield curve. 
Under these circumstances and assuming rational expectations, the short rate expected by the 
market would always equal the current short rate, and the term spread would always equal the 
term premium.  Fluctuations in the spread would have no predictive power for the path of the 
short rate.  Mankiw and Miron’s argument is that the Fed’s interest rate smoothing weakens 
the term structure relationship by preventing any information about the near-term 
expectations to be reflected in short term rates.  In this paper, we note that the performance of 
the expectations hypothesis at the short end of the yield curve improves when an appropriate 
measure of the expected federal funds rate is used.  
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Using data from 1992 through 2010, we find that lower volatility in the funds market 
leads, all else equal, to a lower term premium and thus lower longer-term rates for a given 
setting of the overnight rate.  The result is fairly intuitive.  One reason for the expectations 
hypothesis to hold is through arbitrage.  If the term rate was expected to be above the 
expected overnight rate, a bank could borrow at the overnight rate to fund a term loan and 
earn the spread.  Volatility in the overnight rate, however, creates uncertainty in funding 
costs.  If this uncertainty leads potential arbitrageurs to demand a risk premium for funding a 
term loan through overnight funds, the term premium should rise. 
These results bear on the design of the framework for the implementation of monetary 
policy with regard to the desirable degree of control over the overnight rate.  For example, 
while a simple framework may be desirable from an operational perspective, if a simple 
framework were to lead to an overnight rate that is volatile, term premiums, and therefore 
longer-term rates, would likely be higher.  The results also suggest a different, or perhaps 
additional, interpretation of the changes in the Libor-OIS spread during the financial crisis.  
Researchers who studied the crisis have looked for a link between the Libor-OIS spread and 
counterparty risk, often measure by credit-default-swap (CDS) spreads (see for example, 
Taylor and Williams, 2009, McAndrews et al., 2009).   Additionally, researches have 
attributed narrowing in the spread to the Federal Reserve’s liquidity provision through 
various facilities (see McAndrews et al., 2009, Christensen et al., 2009).  Our results suggest 
an alternative, but easily complementary, channel for the narrowing of the spread.    Figure 1 
plots the three-month Libor-OIS spread together with average intraday volatility over the 
previous 30 days, along with the median CDS spread for the banks in the Libor panel from 
January 2007 to September 2010.
1  Note that volatility in the federal funds rate fell following 
the autumn of 2008, and the Libor-OIS spread declined steadily over the first half of 2009.  
                                                 
1 Intraday volatility is a volume-weighted measure of standard deviation based on total brokered funds rate 




The decline in volatility could have led to at least some of the narrowing of the Libor-OIS 
spread in addition to any contribution from reduced credit risk or central bank interventions. 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows.  The next section discusses estimation 
strategies for the expectations hypothesis, following the existing literature.  We look at the 
effect of including different measures of expectations in the funds market into a standard 
empirical specification and show that the expectations measures that we use matters.  The 
following section shifts the focus to term bank funding rates.  We demonstrate that the 
expectations hypothesis appears to work well for bank funding rates and that volatility in the 
overnight rate can contribute significantly to explaining term premiums.  This main result is 
established for the US as well as the Euro Area and the UK.  This result is of particular 
interest in understanding the term premium during the financial crisis and in understanding 
the implications of different operating environments for the implementation of monetary 
policy.  The final section concludes. 
The Expectations Hypothesis 
  The expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates states that current 
longer-term rates should equal to the average of the expected overnight rate plus some term 
premium that accounts for liquidity risk, credit risk, or other factors.  In practice, we could 
think of the three-month Treasury bill rate (TB3) as the long-term rate and the overnight 
federal funds rate (FFR) to be the short-term rate.  We could write the expectations 
hypothesis as follows: 
[] c FFR E FFR E FFR E FFR TB t t t t t t t t + + + + + = + + + ) ( ... ) ( ) (
90
1
3 90 2 1  
(1) 
         Where  t E  denotes the expectations operator at time t and c is a term premium.  In many 
empirical analysis of the term structure such as Campbell and Schiller, 1991,  Mankiw and 
Miron, 1986, Roberds et al., 1996,  and Lange et al., 2003, a common practice is to assume  
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“perfect foresight” such that  i t i t t FFR FFR E + + = ) (  and test whether today’s 90-day Treasury 
rate is equal to the average realized (not expected) funds rates over the next 90 days.
2  
Furthermore, the term premium is assumed to be constant and captured by the residual in the 
regression. 
The perfect foresight assumption can be removed by replacing the realized funds rates 
with expectations derived from, for example, federal funds futures contracts on the right hand 
side.  The appendix describes the calculation of daily expectations over the next ninety days 
based on federal funds futures contracts.  
Expressing equation (1) in first differences gives us: 
[] ) ( ... ) ( ) (
90
1
3 90 2 1 + + + ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ t t t t t t t t FFR E FFR E FFR E FFR TB  
(2) 
                        
 
In equation (2), the term premium drops due to differencing, under the assumption that it 
changes only a negligible amount from one day to another, which is an even weaker 
assumption than a constant term premium throughout the maturity of the long-term contract.  
This specification is particularly convenient for our purposes because it allows us to 
investigate the importance of imposing the perfect foresight assumption and its implications 
in testing the expectations hypothesis without worrying about the term premium.  
The first column in Table 1 shows the results from the regression where changes in 
the three-month rate are regressed onto changes in the realized funds rate over the next 90 
days, as is typically assumed in the literature.  The sample period extends from January 1, 
1990 through September 15, 2010.   The purpose of this exercise is to re-estimate a well-
accepted specification from the term structure literature and use it for comparison in the later 
analysis.  Note that the slope coefficient is significantly different from its theoretical value of 
                                                 
2 More specifically, the tests check whether the spread between today’s 90-day Treasury rate and the funds rate 
help explain the spread between the average funds rate over the next 90 days and today’s funds rate.  
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one and the 
2 R  is very low.  Instead, the second column shows the regression results where 
the change in the three-month rate is regressed onto the expected changes in the funds rate 
over the next 90 days.  Expected changes in the funds rate over the next 90 and 180 days are 
derived from federal funds futures contracts. The appendix describes our methodology of 
deriving longer term policy expectations in this manner. This time, the coefficient estimate is 
insignificantly different from its theoretical value of one.  Furthermore, the 
2 R  of the 
regression increases noticeably.  
The third and fourth columns in Table 1 show the results from a similar exercise with 
changes in six-month Treasury yield regressed onto the change in the average funds rate in 
the next six months and the change in the average expected funds rate in the next six months.  
The results are similar to the results for the three-month bill rate.  When the expected funds 
rate is used instead of the realized funds rate, the coefficient estimate equals its theoretical 
value of one and 
2 R  increases substantially.   
Market expectations of the funds rate over the future months can also be derived from 
the overnight-indexed swap (OIS) rate. Overnight indexed swaps are over-the-counter traded 
derivatives in which one party agrees to pay a fixed rate in exchange for the average of a 
floating central-bank rate over the life of the swap. For dollar swaps, the floating rate is the 
daily effective federal funds rate. The OIS rate is a measure of market participants’ expected 
average federal funds rate over the relevant term.  One drawback, however, is that data on 
overnight-indexed swaps were not available prior to December 2001 because the market was 
still developing.  In contrast, the measure of expectations that we used in Table 1 goes back 
to 1989 and allows for a longer sample. Table 2 illustrates how the results based on federal 
funds futures contracts compare to those based on OIS rates.  The first column in Table 2 
replicates the first column Table 1 for the sample after December 2001 where the three-
month Treasury bill rate is regressed onto the average funds rate over the next 90 days.  The  
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coefficient estimate is comparable to the one obtained for the longer sample and is 
significantly smaller than one.  The second and third columns replace the average funds rate 
with the expected funds rate based on federal funds futures contracts and three-month OIS 
rate respectively. In both cases, the coefficient estimate associated with the expected funds 
rate is insignificantly different from its theoretical value of one.  The close resemblance 
between the results using either expectations measure is consistent with the discussion in the 
Appendix regarding the close match between the two expectations measures.   
Term premiums and bank funding rates 
The results presented in the previous section suggest that estimation of the 
expectations hypothesis at the near end of the yield curve is sensitive to the use of realized 
rates versus market-based expectations of future short rates.  Using market-based measures of 
expected rates produces results where the expectations hypothesis appears to hold at the short 
end of the yield curve.  This finding suggests that the previously established results regarding 
the weak evidence in favor of the expectations hypothesis arise from the inappropriate proxy 
used for market expectations.  When proper measures of expectations are used instead, the 
evidence strongly supports the expectations hypothesis.  We now turn to studying the term 
premium and analyze its behavior during the current crisis.   
The estimation in the previous section was done in changes, following much of the 
literature, to avoid potential issues of nonstationarity with the interest rates and to avoid the 
term premium.  The level of rates, or more precisely, the level of the term rate relative to the 
expected overnight rate, however, may also be of interest.  Term spreads are typically thought 
to capture risk premiums, and estimating term-structure relationships from spreads are a way 
to avoid stationarity problems.  That said, in the simplest form, using a term spread as the 
dependent variable and estimating the effect of other variables on that spread essentially  
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imposes the expectations hypothesis on the data.  Estimating the relationship in levels to be 
able to test the hypothesis is valid if residuals from the regression are stationary, implying 
that there is a cointegrating relationship in the nonstationary variables.    Furthermore, 
estimating the regression in levels allows us to quantify the components of this term premium 
and better understand the reasons behind interest rate fluctuations during the recent financial 
turmoil.  
  While the results of the previous section appear to be supportive of the expectations 
hypothesis, the comparison of the federal funds rate—an unsecured, bank funding rate—to 
the Treasury bill rate—a riskless, government funding rate—may be a bit problematic 
especially when we consider the variables in levels.  Spreads between these rates will likely 
reflect risk premiums that we would expect, but because the instruments are inherently 
different and the markets have different participants, the comparison is not direct.  To make a 
more direct comparison, we use different bank funding rates, three-month Libor, three-month 
Eurodollar, and three-month federal funds to test the expectations hypothesis.  We run the 
same estimation using the three-month Treasury bill rate as a comparison. In the level 
regressions, the dependent variable is one of the term rates.  According to the expectations 
hypothesis, the term rate should equal expected short rate over the maturity of the term rate 
and a term premium.  In order to capture the expectations component we use the OIS rate or 
the expected funds rate derived from federal funds futures contracts as an independent 
variable.  In this simple specification, the residuals are non-stationary, suggesting that the 
cointegrating relationship, if it exists, has not been captured.  Adding a measure of federal 
funds volatility to capture part of the term premium, we obtain a co-integrating relationship 
that gives stationary residuals.  To compare the results to other research, we also include a 
measure of credit risk, although the latter alone is not sufficient to generate stationary errors 
in the absence of a measure for federal funds volatility.  
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  Table 3 presents the results of benchmark regressions.  Here, we start our sample 
period in January 2001 to be able to use CDS spreads for large banks as a measure of credit 
risk.  Taylor and Williams (2009) use the median five-year CDS annual rate for the banks in 
the US dollar Libor survey starting in 2007.  Importantly, this sample includes relatively calm 
periods in the bank funding market as well as some rather turbulent episodes.  In the upper 
panel  (panel A), we regress the level of the term rate on a constant, comparable maturity OIS 
rate, the realized volatility of the federal funds rate, and the median  CDS spread for large 
banks.  This is our benchmark specification.  The last two terms are intended to capture the 
term premium.  Volatility in the federal funds market can be measured in different ways.  In 
these results, we show the results from using the average intraday volatility over the 
preceding 30 days as a proxy for expected volatility in the near future.  However, the results 
are robust to using other measures of funds rate volatility, such as realized daily standard 
deviation of the federal funds rate or the mean absolute deviation of the funds rate from the 
target over the prior 30 days (not shown).  If the expectations hypothesis were to hold 
perfectly, the constant term would equal a time-invariant term premium and the slope on the 
OIS rate would equal one.  
  Column 1 in the upper panel of Table 3 shows that for three-month Libor, the 
coefficient on the OIS rate is very close to one.
3  The coefficient, however, is rather precisely 
measured and is statistically significantly different from one.  The median CDS spread has a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient, confirming the results in other research that, 
conditional on a given level of the expected path for the funds rate, greater credit risk among 
banks is associated with a wider term premium.  Volatility in the federal funds market is also 
statistically significant and associated with a wider term premium.  Finally, the R-squared of 
the regression is very high.  The high R-squared, however might lead one to suspect that the 
                                                 




regression is subject to spurious correlation, given the fact that interest rates are typically 
found to be nonstationary.  However, the stationarity of the residuals, and thus the presence 
of the cointegrating relationship, implies that the regression is valid and the coefficients are 
estimated consistently. 
  What does the first column of results tell us?  Essentially, the slope coefficient 
suggests that the expectations hypothesis basically holds for bank funding markets from the 
overnight rate to the three-month rate.  The term premium, however, is importantly linked to 
credit risk.  This result should be unsurprising, as many studies of the Libor-OIS spread 
during the current financial crisis have found a robust correlation between the spread and 
CDS spreads, other measures of credit risk, and other measures of liquidity risk, see for 
example Schwarz, 2009, Taylor and Williams, 2009, and Christensen, Lopez, and 
Rudebusch, 2009.  Other researchers have examined the role risk or central bank intervention 
has played in determining the Libor-OIS spread.  What is novel here, is the fact that the 
volatility in the federal funds rate is also statistically and economically significant.  During 
normal times, volatility in the federal funds rate is around 5 basis points.  During the financial 
crisis, average monthly intraday volatility got as high as 90 basis points, implying that this 
volatility could be responsible for as much as 278 (=90×3.09) basis points of the Libor-OIS 
spread.    Figure 2 plots the Libor-OIS spread, the fitted value from our regression, and the 
spread that our model suggests is attributable to federal funds volatility.  Of note, following 
year end 2008, volatility in the federal funds rate declined notably and the Libor-OIS spread 
narrowed even more.  To be sure, general market conditions improved, however, the ability 
of a bank that might be inclined to arbitrage term markets was clearly enhanced by greater 
certainty over the path of the funds rate. 
  Columns 2 and 3 provide robustness checks and present a similar picture for the three-
month Eurodollar rate and the three-month federal funds rate.  Qualitatively, the results are  
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virtually identical.  The slope coefficient is close to one, credit market risk is a significant 
explanatory variable, and volatility in the overnight market is statistically significant.   
  The picture is a bit different when the term rate is the three-month Treasury bill rate.  
The coefficients on CDS spreads and on federal funds rate volatility are both statistically 
significant, but negative.  These results, however, are intuitive.  The Treasury bill is a risk-
free instrument and, more importantly, a safe-haven asset.  When markets experience 
elevated risk or volatility, demand for the safest assets increases, driving down the yield on 
Treasury bills.  The fact that the coefficients are of opposite signs, however, underscores the 
advantages of comparing like types of funding rates. 
  As an additional robustness check, we repeat the analysis by replacing the OIS rate 
with the measure of the expected funds rate that is derived from federal funds futures 
contracts. As shown in the lower panel of table 3 (panel B), the results are essentially 
identical, reflecting the fact that our two expectations measures are very similar.  This result 
is reassuring because the federal funds futures data are available prior to 2001, allowing us to 
extend our sample period backwards and yet be confident that the results are not dependent 
on a single measure of expectations. 
Taylor and Williams (2009) note that in addition to credit-default-swap spreads, the 
spread between the yen-denominated Libor and Tibor, or the spread between Libor and repo 
rates can be used as alternative measures of counterparty risk.  These measures of risk not 
only provide a robustness check for our results, they also allow us to extend our sample 
period.  In Table 4, we repeat the analysis in Table 3 but replace the CDS spread with the 
Libor-Tibor spread.
4 The upper panel (panel A) uses the OIS rate as a measure of 
expectations.  Overall, the results are comparable to Table 3 although the credit risk measure 
has the opposite sign in the Eurodollar equation and insignificant in the funds rate equation.  
                                                 
4 Tibor rate is forwarded one period relative to Libor in computing the Libor-Tibor spread to adjust for the time 
difference between London and Tokyo.  
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In the lower panel (panel B), we replace the OIS rate with the federal funds futures based 
measure of expectations and expand the sample period backwards to November 1995.
5 When 
we take advantage of a longer sample, all the coefficient estimates become significant and 
their values are comparable to those in Table 3.  The coefficient estimates associated with the 
Libor-Tibor spread are significantly larger than those associated with the CDS spread and the 
difference is statistically significant.  
Table 5 contemplates yet another measure of counterparty risk considered in Taylor 
and Williams (2009).  Instead of using the median CDS spread as we have considered in 
Table 3, we use an index of the CDS spread constructed by the Board of Governors. The 
results are comparable to the benchmark specification in Table 3.       
The main focus in Taylor and Williams (2009) is to analyze the effectiveness of the 
Term Auction Facility in driving down the spread on term lending rates. To that end, they test 
for the significance of dummy variables for the day of TAF auctions and each of the four 
days following the auction.  In order to check how their results change after we control for 
federal funds volatility, we add dummy variables for TAF days into our specification and 
adjust our sample period to match with theirs.  While the coefficient estimates for the TAF 
dummies are negative, none of them are significant (not shown).  The literature has not 
reached an agreement on how to measure the effectiveness of TAF.  As an alternative to 
Taylor and Williams (2009), Wu (2008) defined a TAF dummy that equals zero before the 
TAF was first introduced on December 12, 2007, and one afterwards.
6  This specification 
assumes that the TAF facility would permanently reduce liquidity risk affecting interbank 
lending markets.  Table 6 shows the results from the specification using this dummy variable.  
As shown, the TAF dummy is negative and highly significant for all term rates.  While we do 
                                                 
5 Tibor data is available after November 1995, which determines the beginning of the sample size in panel B. 




not take a stand on the interpretation of these types of analyses, our main results are robust to 
the inclusion of these measures.  We conclude that, however effective the TAF was in 
narrowing spreads and lowering rates, the role of volatility in the funds market also needs to 
be considered.  
 
Robustness Analysis 
One question regarding the interpretation of our results is whether the impact of 
intraday volatility on the term premium is driven by the extraordinary fluctuations in this 
variable during the crisis period.  In order to control for the crisis, we generate a dummy 
variable that captures the crisis period and interact this dummy variable with intraday 
volatility in our benchmark specification.
7 Table 7 shows the results from this analysis. As 
shown, intraday volatility is significant both before and after the crisis. The difference 
between the two periods is statistically insignificant for most rates except for the Treasury 
rate.  For the Treasury rate, the volatility enters with a negative sign only during the crisis 
period, suggesting that the volatility in the crisis affected that market differently.  
One way to reconcile our results with the liquidity premium theory is to note that 
intraday volatility may at least partially capture the liquidity risk component of the term 
premium.  This way of interpreting our results would go against Taylor and Williams (2009) 
argument that the Libor-OIS spread should not contain any liquidity risk.  In order to test this 
argument more thoroughly we add additional measures of liquidity risk to our benchmark 
specification such as the spread between the six-month and three-month Treasury bill rates 
and the volume in the federal funds market.  Furthermore, in order to control for potential 
spillovers between the major financial markets, we also add the interbank volatilities in the 
                                                 
7 The dummy variable takes the value fo 1 from August 9, 2007 through the end of our sample on September 15, 
2010.   
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Euro area and UK.
8  Table 8 shows the results from this exercise.  Two observations are 
noticeable.  First, the additional liquidity risk measures are highly significant in most of the 
regressions.  From a theoretical perspective, Eisenschmidt and Tapking (2009) reached a 
similar conclusion for the Euro area, arguing that the rates in the interbank markets could not 
be explained with credit risk alone and the liquidity risk should play a role.  Second, intraday 
volatility is still significant even in the presence of the additional liquidity measures.  Finally, 
intraday volatilities in the Euro area and the UK are generally significant in affecting the 
money market rates in the US both in the period before and after the crisis. 
As a final robustness test, we check for GARCH effects.  We show the results for the 
Libor equation in Table 9.  Intraday volatility is significant for the mean equation before and 
after the crisis.  Meanwhile, measures of credit and liquidity risk have a negative impact on 
the variance of Libor.
9  
 
An Extension for the Euro Area and the UK 
So far we have established the role of volatility on short term interest rates in the US.  
In this section, we extend our analysis to the Euro Area and the UK.  The first column in 
Table 10 shows the results for the Euro Area where the benchmark specification is estimated 
for this region.  Here, Libor is replaced by Euribor and the thirty-day trailing standard 
deviation of the Eonia is used as a measure for volatility.  The second column adds intraday 
volatility in the US and the UK to the Euribor equation before and after the crisis.  Eonia 
volatility is significant in affecting Euribor similar to our results for the US.  However, the 
impact of volatility after the crisis is significantly different from its impact before the crisis. 
Furthermore, volatility in the US as well as the UK are significant in affecting Eonia both 
                                                 
8 Interbank volatility in the Euro area and the UK are measured by the standard deviations in the overnight 
lending rates in these regions (Eonia and Sonia respectively) over the last 30 days. 
9 For further robustness checks, we consider adding a dummy variable to control for volatility on quarter-ends 
(McAndrews et al. (2009) which turns out to be insignificant (not shown).  
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before and after the crisis as well, although their significance increases dramatically during 
the crisis.  The spread between the six-month and three-month German bond rates, which is 
added as an additional measure of liquidity risk, is insignificantTable 11 checks for the 
presence of GARCH effects.  Most of the regressors that are significant in the mean equation 
are also significant in the variance equation.  US volatility has a larger impact on the mean 
equation for Euribor relative to Eonia volatility during the crisis period.  
Tables 12 and 13 are the counterparts of Tables 10 and 11 for the UK.  This time, the 
dependent variable is Sterling-denominated Libor.  As the additional measure of liquidity 
risk, we use the spread between the three month and overnight repo rates.  The results are 
very similar to those obtained for the Euro Area.  Own overnight volatility as well as foreign 
overnight volatilities are significant in determining the term premium which is more 
pronounced after the crisis.. Evidence of GARCH effects are detected in the variance 
equation.  
Conclusions 
The results presented above have a variety of implications.  First, the results provide 
another set of evidence that the expectations hypothesis is generally a valid characterization 
of the term structure of interest rates, at least at the very near end of the yield curve.  In terms 
of levels, a higher degree of volatility in the overnight rate is associated with a greater term 
premium.  That is to say, greater volatility leads to a higher longer-term rate for a given level 
of the short rate.  If one mechanism through which the expectations hypothesis holds is 
intertemporal arbitrage, lenders lending long while funding themselves short, volatility in the 
short rate increases the risk associated with this trade, making the lender demand a higher 
term premium.  
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The implications of these findings are varied.  Failure to find empirical support for the 
expectations hypothesis could reflect mismeasurement of expectations, not simply a 
refutation of the hypothesis.  Our results confirm that using measures of the expected federal 
funds rate instead of the realized federal funds rate yields results that tend to support the 
expectations hypothesis.  Second, in the current financial crisis, a great deal of attention has 
been paid to the Libor-OIS spread.  The popular view is that this spread reflects liquidity and 
term premiums in the bank funding market, and thus the spread can be used as a summary 
statistic for those strains.  Those effects are surely present, however these results suggest also 
considering the volatility in the overnight rate when interpreting that spread.  Essentially, the 
higher volatility adds to the liquidity risk that exists in the market.  This result is true for the 
US as well as the Euro Area and the UK. Furthermore, interbank volatility in one market has 
spillovers in other markets.   Finally, the Federal Reserve has changed its operating procedure 
for the daily implementation of monetary policy.  The high level of reserve balances in the 
banking system has led to a discussion of various tools at the central bank’s disposal for its 
“exit strategy” from its current accomodative stance.  If those tools lead to an operating 
framework where the overnight rate is more volatile than it had been, even conditional on 
being able to hit a target rate on avearge, then the results presented above suggest that term 
premiums should be higher and, all else equal, longer-term interest rates will be higher 
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Table 1: Testing the Expectations Hypothesis  
 
 
  t TB3 ∆   t TB6 ∆  
 1/1/90-6/18/10  1/1/90-3/22/10 
 I  II  III  IV 
Constant  0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 
  -2.04 -0.70 -2.28 -0.80 
) ( 90 FFR Avg ∆   0.42** -- 0.51** -- 
  2.85  4.51  
[] ) ( 90 FFR Avg Et ∆   --  1.00**  --  1.04** 
   15.00  29.41 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.01 0.26 0.01 0.51 
Number  of  Obs.  4897 4897 4835 4835 
t-statistics (based on White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors) are below the coefficient 
estimates.  
*/** indicates significance at 90%/95% level of significance. 
 
Realized average funds rate for TB3 (TB6) equation is calculated over the next 90 (180) days.  
 
Expected average funds rate ( [ ] ) (FFR Avg Et  ) for the TB3 (TB6) equation is calculated from 
federal funds futures contracts over the next 90 (180) days as described in the appendix.  
 
 
Table 2: Testing the Expectations Hypothesis with Alternative Measures of 
Expectations  
 
Sample Period: 12/4/2001-6/18/2010  
Dependent variable:  t TB3 ∆  
 
  I II  III 
Constant 0.00  0.00  0.00 
 -1.45  -0.97  -1.12 
) ( 90 FFR Avg ∆   0.39 --  -- 
 1.04     
[] ) ( 90 FFR Avg Et ∆   --  1.16** -- 
   6.35   
∆OIS (Three month)  --  -- 
0.95** 
     6.46 
Adjusted  R
2  0.00 0.21 0.15 
Number of Obs.  2046  2046  2046 
t-statistics (based on White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors) are below the coefficient 
estimates.  










Table 3: Testing the Expectations Hypothesis for various Interest Rates 
 
Panel A: Using OIS rate as a measure of expectations 
 
Sample Period: 12/4/2001-9/15/2010 
 I  II  III  IV 
 Libor  ED  Term  FFR  T-Bill 
1. Constant  -0.12**  -0.30**  -0.20**  0.12** 
 -12.37  -18.91  -15.09  13.00 
2. OIS (3-month)  0.99**  0.98**  0.97**  0.92** 
 376.51  238.98  288.06  282.88 
3. Intraday Vol.  3.09**  4.21**  3.89**  -0.99** 
 30.57  25.79  30.73  -10.18 
4. CDS (median)  0.33**  0.61**  0.42**  -0.10** 
 20.44  25.15  20.18  -7.83 
5. Adjusted R
2 0.99  0.97  0.98  0.99 
6. Number of Obs.  2197  2195  2201  2198 
   
 
Panel B: Using federal funds futures based measure of expectations 
 
Sample Period: 12/4/2001-9/15/2010 
 I  II  III  V 
 Libor  ED  Term  FFR  T-Bill 
1. Constant  -0.11**  -0.28**  -0.19**  0.13** 
 -10.74  -17.61  -13.71  14.50 
2.  [ ] ) (FFR Avg Et   0.99** 0.99** 0.98** 0.93** 
 365.08  232.65  276.59  263.07 
3. Intraday Vol.  3.14**  4.24**  3.91**  -0.97** 
 31.22  25.80  30.27  -9.04 
4. CDS (median)  0.32**  0.60**  0.41**  -0.10** 
 19.75  24.40  19.41  -8.03 
5. Adjusted R
2 0.99  0.97  0.98  0.99 
6. Number of Obs.  2217  2197  2202  2199 
t-statistics (based on White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors) are below the coefficient 
estimates.  
*/** indicates significance at 90%/95% level of significance. 
 
One day forward Libor rate is used in the regressions to adjust for the time difference between New 
York and London. 
 
[ ] ) (FFR Avg Et  is the expected funds rate calculated from federal fund futures contracts over the 
maturity of the security (which is 90-days for  all the securities considered in this table). 
 





Table 4: Testing the Expectations Hypothesis using Libor-Tibor spread as a 
measure of risk 
 
Panel A: Using OIS rate as a measure of expectations 
 
Sample Period: 12/4/2001-9/15/2010 
 I  II  III  IV 
 Libor  ED  Term  FFR  T-Bill 
1. Constant  0.19**  0.10**  0.09**  0.01 
 13.32  3.93  5.02  0.47 
2. OIS (3-month)  0.92**  0.89**  0.90**  0.95** 
 286.55  158.51  201.16  490.73 
3. Intraday Vol.  3.27**  5.32**  4.54**  -0.95** 
 32.77  31.24  35.17  -7.43 
4. Libor-Tibor  0.66**  -0.44**  -0.05  -0.37** 
 8.69  -3.30  -0.46  -3.30 
5. Adjusted R
2 0.99  0.96  0.98  0.99 
6. Number of Obs.  2073  2017  2020  2020 
    
 
Panel B: Using federal funds futures based measure of expectations 
 
Sample Period: 11/14/1995-9/15/2010 
 I  II  III  IV 
 Libor  ED  Term  FFR  T-Bill 
1. Constant  0.28**  0.40**  0.29**  -0.01** 
 31.89  27.39  25.62  -2.57 
2.  [] ) (FFR Avg Et   0.93** 0.87**  0.91**  0.96** 
 301.30  172.58  215.93  562.77 
3. Intraday Vol.  2.18**  2.94**  2.77**  -0.56** 
 21.86  18.17  20.53  -10.10 
4. Libor-Tibor  1.03**  1.44**  1.11**  -0.39** 
 16.71  15.11  14.07  -6.76 
5. Adjusted R
2 0.99  0.97  0.98  0.99 
6. Number of Obs.  3540  3437  3413  3419 
 
t-statistics (based on White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors) are below the coefficient 
estimates.  
*/** indicates significance at 90%/95% level of significance. 
 
One day forward Libor rate is used in the regressions to adjust for the time difference between New 
York and London. Similarly, Tibor rate is forwarded one period relative to Libor in computing the 
Libor-Tibor spread to adjust for the time difference between London and Tokyo. 
 
[ ] ) (FFR Avg Et  is the expected funds rate calculated from federal fund futures contracts over the 
maturity of the security  (which is 90-days for  all the securities considered in this table). 
 
Tibor data is available after 1995, which determines the beginning of the sample size in panel B. 
 




Table 5: Testing the Expectations Hypothesis using CDS index as a measure of 
risk 
 
Sample Period: 12/4/2001-9/15/2010 
 I  II  III  IV 
 Libor  ED  Term  FFR  T-Bill 
1. Constant  -0.14**  -0.35**  -0.24**  0.11** 
 -16.97  -28.67  -22.18  12.68 
2. OIS (3-month)  0.99**  0.99**  0.98**  0.93** 
 456.73  299.32  350.07  298.58 
3. Intraday Vol.  3.05**  4.09**  3.81**  -1.01** 
 30.95  25.61  30.41  -10.22 
4. CDS index  0.32**  0.62**  0.43**  -0.08** 
 28.00  41.41  30.35  -6.59 
5. Adjusted R
2 0.99  0.98  0.98  0.99 
6. Number of Obs.  2198  2196  2202  2199 
t-statistics (based on White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors) are below the coefficient 
estimates.  
*/** indicates significance at 90%/95% level of significance 
 
One day forward Libor rate is used in the regressions to adjust for the time difference between New 
York and London.  
 
 
Table 6: Testing the effectiveness of TAF 
 
Sample Period: 1/3/2007-6/4/2009 
 I  II  III  IV 
 Libor  ED  Term  FFR  T-Bill 
1. Constant  -0.51**  -0.64**  -0.54**  0.08** 
 -21.59  -15.24  -15.32  2.75 
2. OIS (3-month)  1.03**  1.01**  1.01**  0.92** 
 217.93  127.08  150.08  129.45 
3. Intraday Vol.  3.32**  4.48**  4.11**  -0.95** 
 33.34  27.53  32.72  -8.49 
4. CDS index  0.64**  0.89**  0.67**  -0.05** 
 29.62  23.99  21.04  -2.08 
5. TAF dummy  -0.16**  -0.16**  -0.10**  -0.01** 
 -9.61  -5.89  -4.30  -0.46 
6. Adjusted R
2 0.99  0.97  0.98  0.99 
7. Number of Obs.  915  925  931  929 
 
t-statistics (based on White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors) are below the coefficient 
estimates.  
*/** indicates significance at 90%/95% level of significance 
One day forward Libor rate is used in the regressions to adjust for the time difference between New 
York and London.  
 
The maturities for the Libor, Eurodollar, term fed funds, and Treasury Bills are three months.   
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Table 7: Robustness Analysis I 
 
Sample Period: 12/4/2001-9/15/2010 
 I  II  III  IV 
 Libor  ED  Term  FFR  T-Bill 
1. Constant  -
0.10** -0.25** -0.18** -0.06** 
 -6.55  -11.18  -9.13  -5.57 
2. OIS (3-month)  0.99** 0.99**  0.97**  0.91** 
 356.49 221.55  265.75  286.02 
3. Intraday Vol. ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   2.64** 3.40** 3.42** 2.24** 
 11.47  9.34  11.36  11.77 
4. Intraday Vol. 
Crisis D ×  3.07** 4.17**  3.87**  -0.84** 
 29.35  24.63  29.63  -9.30 
5. CDS_median  0.31** 0.57**  0.40**  0.03** 
 16.63  20.72  16.37  2.67 
6. Adjusted R
2 0.99  0.97  0.98  0.99 
7. Number of Obs.  2197  2194  2200  2197 
t-statistics (based on White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors) are below the coefficient 
estimates.  
 































Table 8: Robustness Analysis II 
 
Sample Period: 12/4/2001-9/15/2010 
 I  II  III  IV 
 Libor  ED  Term  FFR  T-Bill 
1. Constant  -1.34**  -0.72  -1.05**  1.80** 
 -4.17  -1.36  -2.46  7.05 
2. OIS (3-month)  1.00**  0.98**  0.98**  0.91** 
  338.57 194.00 223.02 261.68 
3. Intraday Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   1.11** 2.40** 2.00** 2.84** 
 5.85  7.73  7.89  12.83 
4. Intraday Vol. 
Crisis D ×  1.98**  2.71**  2.51**  -0.51** 
 13.74  12.59  15.69  -5.07 
5. CDS_median  0.30**  0.47**  0.34**  -0.09** 
 16.49  13.37  11.31  -5.10 
6. TB6-TB3  0.49**  0.70 **  0.62**  -0.54** 
 12.97  8.91  9.11  -12.32 
7. FF Volume  0.10**  0.04  0.08**  -0.16** 
 3.54  0.84  1.99  -6.94 
8. Eonia Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   0.45** 0.62** 0.49**  -0.03 
 10.50  8.99  9.11  -0.94 
9. Eonia Vol. 
Crisis D ×   0.25**  0.58** 0.09 0.48** 
  2.12 3.15 0.60 9.24 
10. Sonia Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   0.14** -0.13**  -0.03  -0.12** 
 7.39  -4.24  -1.22  -5.59 
11. Sonia Vol. 
Crisis D ×   1.00** 1.42** 1.45** 0.11** 
 15.47  15.04  17.36  2.47 
12. Adjusted R
2  0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 
13. Number of Obs.  2139  2192  2194  2198 






















Table 9: GARCH Effects for the US 
 
 
Sample Period: 12/4/2001-9/15/2010 
Dependent Variable: Libor (3-month) 
 





1. Constant  -1.23**  0.01** 
 -13.94  286.84 
2. OIS (3-month)  0.99**  -0.00** 
 1230.20  -10.23 
3. Intraday Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   0.60** -0.01 
 15.06  -1.18 
4. Intraday Vol. 
Crisis D ×  1.41**  0.01** 
 58.87  3.51 
5. CDS_median  0.08**  -0.00** 
 23.94  -6.88 
6. TB6-TB3  0.08**  -0.00** 
 13.54  -8.10 
7. FF Volume  0.11**  -0.00** 
 14.09  -1327.46 
8. Eonia Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   0.07** -0.00 
 3.71  -1.01 
9. Eonia Vol. 
Crisis D ×  0.37**  -0.01** 
 20.96  -8.83 
10. Sonia Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   0.07** -0.00** 
 16.02  -10.23 
11. Sonia Vol. 
Crisis D ×  1.28**  0.01** 
 74.34  2.46 
12. 
2
1 − Residual    0.81** 
   21.44 
13.  1 − GARCH    -0.18** 
   -4.44 
14. Adjusted R
2 0.99   
15. Number of Obs.  2156   
 
z-statistics (based on Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors & covariance) are shown below the 
coefficient estimates.  












Table 10: Testing the Expectations Hypothesis for the Euro Area using median 
CDS as a measure of Expectations 
 
 
Sample Period: 1/2/2001-9/15/2010 
Dependent Variable: Euribor (3-month) 
 
 I  II 
1. Constant  -0.12**  0.04** 
 -12.75  8.01 
2. OIS (3-month)  1.06**  1.00** 
 327.08  452.65 
3. Eonia Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   -0.39** 0.07** 
 -12.96  7.07 
4. Eonia Vol.
Crisis D ×  2.62**  0.83** 
 23.37  16.28 
5. CDS (median)  0.22**  0.15** 
 14.66  17.57 
6. German Bond (6m)-German Bond (3m)  --  0.02 
   1.13 
7. Intraday Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   -- -0.06* 
   -1.81 
8. Intraday Vol.
Crisis D ×  --  1.26** 
   28.68 
9. Sonia Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   -- -0.08** 
   -7.08 
10.Sonia Vol. 
Crisis D ×  --  0.86** 
   24.16 
11. Adjusted R
2 0.99  0.99 
12. Number of Obs.  2485  2479 
t-statistics (based on White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors) are below the coefficient 
estimates.  



















Table 11: GARCH Effects for the Euro Area 
 
 
Sample Period: 1/2/2001-9/15/2010 
Dependent Variable: Euribor (3-month) 
 





1. Constant  0.06**  0.00** 
 22.27  12.30 
2. OIS (3-month)  1.00**  -0.00** 
 1282.70  -6.76 
3. STD_Eonia  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   0.05** -0.00** 
 7.03  -2.80 
4. STD_Eonia
Crisis D ×  0.05**  -0.01** 
 7.03  -5.29 
5. CDS (median)  0.13**  -0.01** 
 48.93  -5.29 
6. German Bond (6m)-German Bond 
(3m) 0.00  -0.00** 
 0.17  -3.48 
7. Intraday Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   -0.01 -0.01** 
 -0.45  -6.48 
8. Intraday Vol.
Crisis D ×  1.24**  -0.00* 
 75.58  -1.62 
9. Sonia Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   -0.07** -0.00** 
 -15.52  -2.74 
10.Sonia Vol. 
Crisis D ×  0.83**  0.01** 
 48.25  4.80 
11. 
2
1 − Residual    0.57** 
   9.25 
12.  1 − GARCH    -0.05 
   -0.48 
13. R
2 0.99   
14. Number of Obs.  2478   
z-statistics (based on Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors & covariance) are shown below the 
coefficient estimates.  
















Dependent Variable: Sterling denominated Libor (3-month) 
 
 I  II 
1. Constant  -0.18**  -0.09** 
 -10.33  -5.84 
2. OIS (3-month)  1.06**  1.03** 
 286.60  291.10 
3. Sonia Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   -0.25** -0.04** 
 -20.45  -2.95 
4. Sonia Vol.  ) (
Crisis D ×   2.29** 1.44** 
 24.77  21.33 
5. CDS (median)  0.50**  0.27** 
 28.96  13.11 
6. RP(3m)-RP(ON)  --  0.02** 
   3.68 
7. Intraday Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   -- 0.12** 
   2.42 
8. Intraday Vol.
Crisis D ×  --  0.95** 
   13.64 
9. Eonia Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   -- 0.14** 
   8.63 
10. Eonia Vol. 
Crisis D ×  --  1.47** 
   13.84 
11. Adjusted R
2 0.99  0.99 
12. Number of Obs.  2444  2442 
t-statistics (based on White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors) are below the coefficient 
estimates.  




















Table 13: GARCH Effects for the UK 
 
 
Sample Period: 1/2/2001-9/15/2010 
Dependent Variable: Sterling Denominated Libor (3-month) 
 





1. Constant  -0.07**  0.01** 
 -11.31  10.68 
2. OIS (3-month)  1.03**  -0.00** 
 755.22  -4998.93 
3. Sonia Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   -0.02** -0.00** 
 -3.46  -3.84 
4. Sonia Vol.  ) (
Crisis D ×   1.52** 0.06** 
 38.43  5.06 
5. CDS (median)  0.14**  -0.00** 
 20.11  -4.21 
6. RP(3m)-RP(ON)  0.01**  -0.00** 
 2.45  -2.08 
7. Intraday Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   0.04** -0.02** 
 2.29  -6.48 
8. Intraday Vol.
Crisis D ×  1.27**  -0.01 
 42.19  -1.58 
9. Eonia Vol.  ) 1 (
Crisis D − ×   0.12** -0.01** 
 9.08  -5.00 
10. Eonia Vol. 
Crisis D ×  1.46**  -0.04** 
 40.84  -6.36 
11. 
2
1 − Residual    0.58** 
   8.87 
12.  1 − GARCH    -0.04 
   -0.40 
13. Adjusted R
2 0.99   
14. Number of Obs.  2442   
 
z-statistics (based on Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors & covariance) are shown below the 
coefficient estimates.  

















































2007 2008 2009 2010
Libor-OIS Spread
Predicted Spread




Predicted Spread=(Predicted Libor from Table 3, column 1)-OIS 
Spread due to FFR volatility= ×
^
Vol β FFR Volatility 
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Appendix: Calculation of 90-day Expectations 
 
The following diagram illustrates our logic in calculating 90-day expectations 
 
where 
1 t : the current day 
i m : the number of days in month i 
2 t : the number of days included from the 4th month  
( 2 t [ ] ) ( 90 1 1 3 2 t m m m − + + − = ) 
k : day of FOMC meeting in month 4. 
A: Average expected funds rate in the remaining days of the current month 
B: Average expected funds rate in month 2 
C: Average expected funds rate in month 3 
D: Average expected funds rate until  2 t  in month 4 
We now describe how we calculate each of these components A through D.  
A: Average expected funds rate in the remaining days of the current month 
On day t, spot month futures contract ( t FF1 ) reflects the expected funds rate 










t i t t FFR E
m
FF µ  
(A.1) 
where  1 m  is the total number of days in month 1 (current month),  t E is the 
expectations operator based on information as of day t,  FFR  is the effective funds 
t1  t2        k 
      A                             B                                   C                     D  
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rate, and  t µ  is a term that may represent the risk premium or day of month effects in 
the futures market.  In an efficient market with risk-neutral investors, this term would 
be zero. 


































Equation (A.2) notes that the spot month futures contract on day t has two 
components. The first component is the funds rate that is realized up to that date, and 
the second component is the expected funds rate on the remaining days of the month. 
Solving for the second term gives us the average expected funds rate for the 









































B and C: Average expected funds rates in months 2 and 3 
Average expected funds rates in months 2 and 3 as of day t are equal to the 
futures rates for the two-month and three-month contracts less the term premium 
respectively.  
D: Average expected funds rate until  2 t  in month 4 
Note that  2 t denotes the last day included in 90-day expectations from the 
fourth month.  Calculating the average expected funds rate over that time period is a 
bit trickier than the previous months. If there is no FOMC meeting in that month, 
then, average expected funds rate until  2 t is simply equal to the futures rate for the 
four-month contract less the term premium.  If there is an FOMC meeting at a date  
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after  2 t  (i.e.  2 t <k) , then the average expected funds rate is equal to the expected 
target for the third month.
10  If the FOMC meeting is scheduled prior to  2 t  (i.e.  2 t >k), 
then the average expected funds rate is equal to the expected target for the third month 
for the first k days, and it is equal to the expected target for the fourth month from day 
k through day  2 t .  
Average expected funds rate over the next 90-days 
Once these components are calculated, we can derive the average expected 




2 3 2 1 D t C m B m A t m
Exp
+ + + −
=  
Expectations calculated in this manner are comparable to the three-month OIS 
rate. Figure A.1 illustrates the close resemblance between these two series.
11 Note that 
the OIS series is only available after 2001 while the expectations calculated from 
federal funds futures are available since May 1989.  The correlation coefficient 






                                                 
10 Expected target for any month j , ) ( j t T E , can be calculated in a recursive manner as 
k m
T kE FFJ m
T E
j








Where FFJ is the J-month federal funds futures contract rate.  If k corresponds to the last five days of a 
month, then,  t t j t J FF T E µ − + = ) 1 ( ) ( . If there is no FOMC in month j, then 
). ( ) ( 1 − = j t j t T E T E See Demiralp (2008) for more details.  
11 In our calculations we set  t µ to three basis points, consistent with the calculations in Gurkaynak, Sack 
and Swanson (2007).  
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